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ARTICLE

THE POST-CHICAGO ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: A
RETROSPECTIVE

CHRISTOPHER S. YOO†
A symposium examining the contributions of the post-Chicago School provides an
appropriate opportunity to offer some thoughts on both the past and the future of
antitrust. This afterword reviews the excellent papers presented with an eye toward
appreciating the contributions and limitations of both the Chicago School, in terms of
promoting the consumer welfare standard and embracing price theory as the preferred
mode of economic analysis, and the post-Chicago School, with its emphasis on game
theory and firm-level strategic conduct. It then explores two emerging trends,
specifically neo-Brandeisian advocacy for abandoning consumer welfare as the sole
goal of antitrust and the increasing emphasis on empirical analyses.
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INTRODUCTION
I would like to thank the Law Review staff for inviting me to write the
afterword to what was a terrific symposium. Milestone conferences like this
provide a welcome opportunity to look both backward to see how far the
law has come and forward to project how emerging trends might affect
future developments.
In particular, a conference on “The Post-Chicago Antitrust Revolution”
provides an opportunity to look not only at the post-Chicago School, but also
the Chicago School, which motivated its genesis. In addition, this afterword
is also an apt occasion to speculate about the potential impact of approaches
that have gained increasing attention in recent years, such as neoBrandeisianism and empirical antitrust.
I. THE CHICAGO REVOLUTION
In many ways, the natural place to begin an afterword for a symposium
on “The Post-Chicago Antitrust Revolution” is by looking at the school of
thought that gave this movement its name: the Chicago School. Post-Chicago
scholars often use the Chicago School as the foil for their analyses.1 For
example, this symposium’s opening presentation on “Framing the Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis” used the Chicago School’s position as the
starting point for its critical analysis.2 Other symposium contributors took
similar approaches.3
Scholars differ in their assessment of the Chicago School’s impact. Many
Chicago School supporters have claimed that their arguments have swept the
field.4 Others assert that the Harvard School has proven more influential than
1 For a prominent recent example, see HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE
MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S.
ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008), which collected essays largely positioned as critiques of

the Chicago School.
2 Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,
168 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1844(2020).
3 See Jonathan B. Baker & Joseph Farrell, Oligopoly Coordination, Economic Analysis, and the
Prophylactic Role of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1985, 2002-07, (2020)
(contrasting the authors’ argument with the Chicago School’s views of oligopolies); Andrew I. Gavil
& Steven C. Salop, Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis: Revitalizing
the Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 2109, 2119-24 (2020) (arguing that the
Chicago School’s teachings produced presumptions and burdens of proof that need to be updated).
4 For a classic example see Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and
Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983). See also, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Chicago,
Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1911, 1913 (2009) (reviewing HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1) (discussing the Chicago School’s
“complete and resounding victory” and the “tidal wave of pro-Chicago sentiment” that “continued
to wreak its vengeance” in the 2000s); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-
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the Chicago School in shaping antitrust doctrine.5 Still others have tried to
strike a middle ground, arguing that both schools have played a critical role.6
Differentiating between two separate threads of the Chicago School’s
argument can help reconcile these disparate assessments. The first contends
that consumer welfare/economic efficiency represents the sole focus of
antitrust. With respect to this claim, the Chicago School position prevailed,
with the Harvard School’s support. The second thread involves the Chicago
School’s preferred approach to applying economic analysis principles to
antitrust: price theory. The Chicago School’s success with respect to this
latter aspect is more mixed.
A. Consumer Welfare/Economic Efficiency as the Goal of Antitrust
Although modern antitrust law typically views the Chicago and postChicago Schools as the dominant opposing viewpoints, the Chicago School
initially arose as a reaction to a different movement: the Populist School that
dominated antitrust thinking prior to the 1970s.7 Echoing Louis Brandeis’s
concerns about the “curse of bigness,”8 the Populist School rejected economic
Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 167, 171 (2012)
(concluding that “[t]here was a revolution in antitrust: Chicago prevailed” and that “[t]he Revolution
succeeded; one only has to read the numerous Supreme Court decisions rejecting the ancien régime to
understand the triumph of Chicago”).
5 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1870 (“The Chicago School’s influence on
antitrust decision making in the federal courts has been more ideological than technical. In choosing
technical rules, the Supreme Court has almost always looked to the Harvard School.”); see also, e.g.,
Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions?, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2007, at 59, 60 (concluding that Supreme Court
decisions “indicate an embrace of the moderate Harvard School approach . . . rather than an embrace
of Chicago school principles”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the
Dominant Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 109, 112
(“[A]ntitrust law as produced by the courts today comes much closer to representing the ideas of a
somewhat chastised Harvard School than of any traditional version of the Chicago School.”).
6 See, e.g., Thomas E. Kauper, Influence of Conservative Economic Analysis on the Development of
the Law of Antitrust, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 40,
42 (attributing modern doctrine to a collective “Chicago-Harvard Grinch and perhaps a good
Grinch besides”); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13-14
(2007) (concluding that antitrust law on single-firm conduct reflects a “combination of Chicago
School and Harvard School perspectives”); William H. Page, Areeda, Chicago, and Antitrust Injury:
Economic Efficiency and Legal Process, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 909, 910 (1996) (calling Harvard School
leader Phillip Areeda and the Chicago School “the twin pillars of contemporary antitrust”).
7 For a useful overview of this conflict, see Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative
Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 234-40 (1995).
8 Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, HARPER’S WKLY., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18. This theme is so
influential in Brandeis’s work that an editor chose to use it as the title for a collection of Brandeis’s
papers. THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (Osmond
K. Fraenkel ed., 1935).
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welfare as the sole focus of antitrust and instead embraced a plural approach
that included a wide range of noneconomic concerns, reflected in previous
antitrust symposia published in this journal in 1977 and 1979.9 These scholars
embraced a Jeffersonian conception of an economy comprised of small firms,10
complete freedom of choice by sellers and buyers,11 and the promotion of
wealth redistribution,12 along with expanding purely economic considerations
to include political concerns13 and a preference for per se rules.14
The Supreme Court decisions of the era largely reflected the views of the
Populist School, striking down mergers by firms controlling as little as five
percent of the market15 and declaring a wide range of business practices illegal
9 Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977); Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918 (1979).
10 See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1977) (“The preference for small rather than large
business units would appear to be an ideal candidate for an antitrust equity goal and one readily
achieved through a strict policy against mergers and the more frequent use of dissolution decrees.”);
see also, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 1140, 1150-51 (1981) (noting how the authors of a 1950 amendment of the antitrust laws “wished
to preserve a society of small, independent, decentralized businesses”).
11 See Elzinga, supra note 10, at 1200 (identifying individual liberty as an important equity
objective of antitrust enforcement); see also Fox, supra note 10, at 1151-52 (noting that Supreme Court
decisions in the 1960s and 1970s “protected the freedom of the independent trader to sell where and
to whom the seller pleased”); Thomas E. Kauper, The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of
Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 332 (1968) (“[T]he Court has proceeded
with a method of analysis placing primary emphasis on equality of opportunity, free access to
markets by competing sellers, and complete freedom of choice by buyers.”).
12 See Elzinga, supra note 10, at 1194-96 (advocating for including the redistribution of income
as a goal of antitrust); see also, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1714, 1714-15, 1714 n.3 (1986) (arguing that the goals of antitrust should include the redistribution of
wealth in addition to economic efficiency).
13 See John J. Flynn, Introduction: Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political
and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1186-90 (acknowledging arguments that
antitrust should include political and social goals as well as the goal of economic efficiency); Robert
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (arguing for a
consideration of political values when interpreting antitrust law); Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and
Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1078, 1080 (1979) (agreeing with
Pitofsky that political considerations should represent a central consideration of antitrust and not
just a “tie-breaker in individual cases”).
14 Pitofsky, supra note 13, at 1058 (noting with approval that antitrust “occasionally disregards
claims of efficiency, as in the imposition of per se rules against certain kinds of horizontal cartels”);
Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1081 (arguing that “proper deference to the non-economic goals of
antitrust” involved receptivity to per se rules); see also Fox, supra note 10, at 1183-85 (advocating for
the retention of a number of per se rules for reasons aside from economic efficiency).
15 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568, 578 (1972) (condemning vertical
merger that would have resulted in 10% market share); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 271-72, 279 (1966) (condemning horizontal merger that would have resulted in 7.5% market share);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44, 346 (1962) (condemning horizontal merger
that would have resulted in 5% market share); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
295, 314 (1949) (condemning exclusive dealing contract that would have foreclosed 16% of the market).
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per se without any inquiry into market power.16 In addition, the initial 1968
Merger Guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice under the
leadership of Harvard School scholar Donald Turner were skeptical about
horizontal mergers in concentrated markets that would create firms with as
little as eight percent market share and disfavored any vertical merger
involving firms holding as little as six to ten percent of the market.17
The Chicago School challenged each of these commitments. In particular,
it rejected populists’ advocacy for continuing to base antitrust on a plurality
of considerations in favor of making economic efficiency and consumer
welfare the sole guide to antitrust law.18 This early Chicago work was backed
by empirical scholarship,19 a fact noted even by notable Chicago School
critics.20 Not all Chicago School supporters agreed: some have called for even
more empiricism,21 while others have seen Chicago School scholars (and
indeed the entire field of industrial organization) turning away from
empiricism in the 1980s.22
16 See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (holding maximum retail price
maintenance illegal per se); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967)
(holding nonprice vertical restraints illegal per se); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (holding group boycotts illegal per se); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5, 7-8 (1958) (holding tying illegal per se); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373, 394, 408-09 (1911) (holding minimum retail price maintenance illegal per se).
17 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 5, 12 (1968), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES5W-Q26B].
18 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 79–89 (1978) (concluding that “the
case is overwhelming for judicial adherence to the single goal of consumer welfare in the
interpretation of the antitrust laws” and advocating for “[e]xclusive adherence to a consumer welfare
standard”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 18–20 (1976) (entertaining and rejecting
“[s]ociopolitical [o]bjections” to monopolies including “promot[ing] economic efficiency . . . to
promote small business”).
19 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
135, 151 n.31 (1984) (noting the existence of an empirical literature testing the structure-conductperformance paradigm and whether certain practices constitute barriers to entry, and citing multiple
examples); Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based
Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 246-47, 247 nn.22-27 (2012) (calling empiricism “[t]he second defining
feature of the Chicago School of antitrust” (after price theory), and citing multiple sources).
20 See F.M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 5, 7 (2001) (“One of the great Chicago traditions for students seeking the Ph.D. in industrial
organization was to carry out careful, price theory-based empirical studies of specific real-world
industries and institutions.”).
21 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 931
n.13 (1979) (“It is a curiosity, and a source of regret, that to this day very few of [Chicago School
scholar Aaron] Director’s ideas have been subjected to systematic empirical examination.”).
22 See E. Glen Weyl, Price Theory, 57 J. ECON. LITERATURE 329, 354 (2019) (“Price theory
also receded from applied work for the twenty years starting in the 1980’s . . . .”); Crane, supra note
4, at 1931-32 (calling for the neo-Chicago School to put greater emphasis on empirical work). The
retreat from empiricism was part of a discipline-wide trend that was not unique to the Chicago
School. See Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) (“Although IO [industrial organization] was once a largely empirical
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The Chicago School scored some important victories over the Populist
School in the Supreme Court, which increasingly framed antitrust law in
terms of consumer welfare23 and economic efficiency.24 Consistent with this
emphasis on economic effects, the Supreme Court gradually overruled the
cases holding vertical contractual restraints per se illegal,25 a development
that participants in this symposium applauded as wise.26
Even Populist School supporters came to acknowledge that economic
efficiency had become the central concern of antitrust.27 In the words of one
discipline, in recent decades empirical research has lost much of its market share. The lure of IO for
most young economists was to apply modern mathematical economics to the relatively undeveloped
turf of industrial organization.”).
23 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018) (citing with approval precedent
recognizing that the legality of a vertical restraint turned on whether it would enhance both
“competition and consumer welfare”); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
902, 906 (2007) (overruling antitrust precedent because failure to do so would “hinder[] competition
and consumer welfare” and rejecting rationales that are “[d]ivorced from competition and consumer
welfare”); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 324 (2007) (citing
with approval precedent permitting practices under which “consumer welfare is enhanced”); Brooke
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221, 224 (1993) (noting criticism of
precedent that is “at odds with the antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price
competition” and supporting a recoupment prerequisite in predatory pricing because without it,
“consumer welfare is enhanced” by the practice); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (noting that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
‘consumer welfare prescription’” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)).
24 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978) (making the
appropriateness of a per se rule turn on whether the practice in question tends to “increase economic
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive”); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (quoting language from U.S. Gypsum Co. with
approval); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90,
295 (1985) (quoting language from U.S. Gypsum Co. and Broadcast Music, Inc. with approval).
25 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882, 887-907 (overruling the per se rule banning minimum retail price
maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 10-22 (1997) (overruling the per se rule banning
maximum retail price maintenance); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 4759 (1977) (overruling the per se rule banning nonprice vertical restraints).
26 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1871 (noting that “the Supreme Court
wisely overruled the per se rules against” vertical contractual restraints); see also id. at 1848 (noting
that Chicago School advocacy for overruling precedents prohibiting “competitively harmless vertical
contracting . . . . very likely increased consumer welfare and efficiency”); Gavil & Salop, supra note
3, at 2123 (observing that the abandonment of per se illegality for vertical restraints reflects the
influence of the Chicago School).
27 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 10, at 1140 (“Regard for efficiency is in the ascendancy”); Henry
S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV.
892, 892 (1988) (“Classical microeconomic theory . . . has become the dominant tool for
contemporary antitrust analysis.”); Robert H. Lande, Implications of Professor Scherer’s Research for
the Future of Antitrust, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 256, 258 (1990) (“[T]he dominant paradigm today is that
the only goal of the existing antitrust laws is to increase economic efficiency . . . .”); Lawrence A.
Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1980) (“The Supreme Court is increasingly committed to a conception of competition
that emphasizes efficiency as a dominant social value.”); see also, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond
Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 55 (2005) (“By the end of the 1980s, even those
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commentator, by the mid-1990s, “the debate about the organizing values of
antitrust ha[d] lost its drama,” and “[t]he victory of a purely economic
analysis over . . . the Modern Populist School could hardly seem more
complete.”28 Still, as we shall see in Part III.A, the issue has arisen once again
in the debate over neo-Brandeisian/hipster antitrust.
It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the emergence of economic
considerations as the exclusive touchstone of antitrust law solely to the
Chicago School. Strikingly, the consumer welfare standard also drew support
from the Harvard School, which “underwent a significant transformation in
the late 1970s” from the interventionist position it took in the 1930s to 1960s.29
This new Harvard School agreed with the Chicago School’s rejection of
populist considerations as motivating concerns for antitrust law,30 as
symposium participants have recognized,31 although the Harvard School was
influenced more by institutional competence and other process-based
considerations than the broad conceptual economic framework that motivated

sympathetic to the Populist School were forced to concede that the economic approach to antitrust
had prevailed.”).
28 Jacobs, supra note 7, at 238, 239.
29 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 37 (2005). A key factor in this
“metamorphosis was the unacknowledged conversion experience of Donald F. Turner.” Id.
30 See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 103-113, at 7, 12-13,
24, 30 (1978) (concluding that the case law “support[s] the priority of competition and its efficiency
goals,” that promoting non-efficiency goals would be “[e]xcessively [c]ostly, [f]utile, or
unadministrable,” and that “the contribution to populist goals from rules specially created to promote
them would be far too small to warrant the inevitable legal difficulties, uncertainties, and enforcement
costs they would involve”); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American
Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) (“[I]t is questionable whether populist goals are
appropriate factors to consider when formulating antitrust rules.”); see also Phillip Areeda, Introduction
to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 535, 537 (1983) (concluding that when political and
social values and efficiency values diverge, “there surely is a strong presumption in favor of preferring
customers” and that “[a]ntitrust law has far more to fear from surrendering to vague claims of fairness
or socio-political ends than from disinclined inquiry into how challenged arrangements actually serve
or impair competition,” while cautioning against drawing broad abstract conclusions); Thomas C.
Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1166-67
(1988) (noting that both the Harvard and Chicago Schools agree that the Populist School’s “use of
noneconomic factors confuses and distorts antitrust decisionmaking”); Kovacic, supra note 6, at 35
(“Although Chicago School and Harvard School scholars do not define efficiency identically, the two
schools discourage consideration of non-efficiency objectives such as the dispersion of political power
and the preservation of opportunities for smaller enterprises to compete.” (footnote omitted)).
31 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1876-77 (noting that the total welfare
conception “was historically controlling in both Harvard and Chicago School economics literature,
without significant dissent,” with the standard eventually shifting to consumer welfare) (citing Alan
J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought
Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U L. REV. 659, 690 (2010)).

2152

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 2145

the Chicago School.32 This concurrence was tacit, in that Harvard School
scholars did not explicitly connect their positions to the Chicago School’s.33
The Chicago and Harvard Schools’ concurrence on the primacy of
economic considerations rendered the Populist School’s position untenable.34
Once the Chicago and Harvard Schools agreed that economic analysis should
be the heart of antitrust, debates over antitrust law became what Michael
Jacobs called an “intramural dispute” over the type of economic analysis to
apply.35 The commitment to economic analysis over populist considerations
is also shared by the post-Chicago School.36
The fact that both of the leading antitrust schools of thought supported
treating consumer welfare and economic efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust
should not take away from the Chicago School’s contribution. It is telling that
when endorsing consumer welfare as the antitrust standard, the Supreme Court
cited Chicagoan Robert Bork37 and not the Harvard School scholarship
adopting the same position.38 Revealingly, both critics and supporters give the
Chicago School most of the credit for the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
consumer welfare standard.39 Robert Pitofsky summed up this consensus nicely
32 Crane, supra note 4, at 1919-20; Kovacic, supra note 6, at 41 (arguing that the Chicago School
was more conceptually based on certain economic models, while the Harvard School emphasized
“institutional competence” and “legal process” (quoting Page, supra note 6, at 912-13)).
33 Kovacic, supra note 6, at 40 (“In their co-authored works, Areeda and Turner seldom
acknowledged intellectual debts to other commentators. Their joint work contains few direct
statements or indirect signs (e.g., citation patterns) that indicate significant borrowings from
Chicago School scholars or other researchers.” (footnote omitted)); Page, supra note 6, at 911 (noting
that Areeda “did not often cite Chicago scholars, but neither did he disagree with them directly”
(footnote omitted)). Chicago Scholars were less hesitant in drawing connections to the Harvard
School. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 21, at 925 (noting the “growing consensus” between the Chicago
and Harvard Schools that focused more on “technical disagreements” than on “disagreement over
basic premises, methodology, and ideology”).
34 See Thomas E. Kauper, supra note 6, at 40, 42 (describing how “Chicago’s influence is
virtually conceded”); Crane, supra note 4, at 1918–20 (describing how the Chicago School and
Harvard School have influenced the Court and both “tend toward similar noninterventionist
results”); William E. Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History, 87 U.
CHI. L. REV. 460, 479 (2020) (“Bork inspired the right, and Areeda and Turner brought along
centrists and somewhat left-of-center academics, enforcement officials, judges, and practitioners.”).
35 Jacobs, supra note 7, at 222; accord, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics
that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 646 (1989) (“[W]e need not reject the
value of economic efficiency in order to question the Chicago School. These challenges to Chicago
arise from within the efficiency paradigm.”).
36 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 35, at 646 n.7 (“Some new developments support rather than challenge
Chicago positions.”); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 222, 242 (describing how the post-Chicago school has
“eschew[ed] the subjective inquiries” that were common in the “political approaches of the past”).
37 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
38 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 123
(2018) (“Beginning in 1977–78, the Chicago School achieved an almost complete triumph in the
Supreme Court, at least in the limited sense that the Court came to adopt the economic
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when he found it “unanimous” that the Chicago School had “demolished some
aspects of the antitrust approach of the 1950s and 1960s (Warren Court period)
and eventually displaced it with a more rigorous approach” that “emphasized
exclusively economic considerations (to the complete exclusion of other social
and political values).”40
B. Price Theory
While the Chicago School’s advocacy for making economics the sole focus
of antitrust law ultimately prevailed, its arguments in support of its preferred
mode of economic analysis achieved somewhat more mixed results. The
Chicago School was forthright in its preference for neoclassical price theory.41
Built on the work of such giants as Alfred Marshall and Paul Samuelson, price
theory has been defined as “the explanation of how relative prices are
determined,” primarily through industry-level analyses of supply and demand,
as well as “how prices function to coordinate economic activity.”42 Unlike the
case study approach of the original Harvard School, which explored the
variations in the details of different industries and firms,43 price theory
“simplif[ies] a rich (high-dimensional heterogeneity, many agent, dynamics,
etc.) and often incompletely specified model for the purposes of answering a
simple (scalar or low-dimensional) allocative question.”44
Even critics of the Chicago School’s price theoretic approach have generally
recognized that it has influenced Supreme Court doctrine. The adoption of
pricing below cost as the appropriate test of predatory pricing45 was a clear
efficiency/consumer welfare model as the exclusive or near-exclusive goal of antitrust law.”); Kenneth
Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork, 57 J.L. & ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S19, S20, S32
(2014) (noting that “Bork was not the first to propose the total-welfare standard,” but “[h]e was . . . its
most influential advocate” and concluding that “Bork not only won the battle, he also won the war”).
40 Robert Pitofsky, Introduction to Conservative Economic Analysis and Its Effects, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 7, 7.
41 See BORK, supra note 18, at 116-17 (describing the relationship between antitrust and price
theory and stating “[t]here is no body of knowledge other than conventional price theory that can
serve as a guide to the effects of business behavior upon consumer welfare”); Kobayashi & Muris,
supra note 4, at 154 (describing the “application of price theory and other economics” as “the hallmark
of Chicago School/Aaron Director analysis”); Posner, supra note 21, at 928 (“Director’s conclusions
resulted simply from viewing antitrust policy through the lens of price theory.”); Wright, supra note
19, at 245 (identifying the “rigorous application of price theory” as one of the “defining
characteristics of the Chicago School”).
42 DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 27 (1986).
43 See generally Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2; Herbert Hovenkamp Reimagining
Antitrust: The Revisionist Work of Richard S. Markovits, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1221 (2016) (reviewing
RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S.
AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW (2014)).
44 E. Glen Weyl, Price Theory, 57 J. ECON. LIT. 329, 330 (2019).
45 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-27 (1992)
(requiring a showing of pricing below a rival’s appropriate costs to recover on a predatory pricing
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endorsement of price theory.46 With respect to the leverage theory of tying,
another Chicago School target,47 the Court abandoned the idea that a showing
of market power was unnecessary48 and returned to subjecting tying claims to
a market power requirement.49 Participants in this symposium recognized that
the leverage theory used to justify treating tying as illegal per se without any
showing of foreclosure or exclusion was based on “mistaken arithmetic.”50
Price theory is also often credited as playing a role in the Supreme Court’s
decisions eliminating the per se rule for retail price maintenance51 and
complaint); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (defining predatory pricing
as “pricing below an appropriate measure of cost” that eliminates or reduces competition); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 n.8 (1986) (describing predatory pricing as
when “a single firm . . . cuts its prices in order to force competitors out of the market”).
46 See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Response to
Critique and Further Elaboration, 89 GEO. L.J. 2495, 2506 (2001) (recognizing and criticizing the fact
that Brooke Group relied on price theory); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept of a
Competitive Process, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 893, 895 n.4 (1990) (noting how Matsushita reflected
“[t]he capture of the Court’s understanding of the facts and law by conclusions of neoclassical price
theory”); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies, and the Suppression of Technology, 66
ANTITRUST L.J. 487, 490 n.10 (1998) (noting how Brooke Group relied on neoclassical price theory);
Thomas E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 893, 903 (1987)
(noting that in Matsushita, “the Court relied to an extraordinary degree on neoclassical price theory
to resolve ambiguities in evidence concerning alleged predation”).
47 Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); accord
Posner, supra note 21, at 926 (noting that one of the Chicago school’s “key ideas” is related to “tie-in[s]”).
48 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958) (finding that “‘monopoly power’ or
‘dominance’ over the tying product” is not “a necessary precondition for application of the rule of
per se unreasonableness to tying arrangements”).
49 See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1984) (“[W]e must consider
whether . . . [petitioners] have used their market power to force their patients to accept the tying
arrangement.”); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of
Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1997) (noting that Jefferson Parish appeared to hold that “a plaintiff
had to prove that the defendant had market power of the sort that is required for liability in other
antitrust contexts”). As Gavil and Salop note, the Chicago School had an even bigger impact on Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Jefferson Parish, which embraced the single monopoly rent theorem that
motivated much of the Chicago School’s critique. Gavil & Salop, supra note 3, at 2124.
50 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1867; see also Gavil & Salop, supra note 3, at
2123 (noting that “[t]he per se prohibition of tying is teetering” because of the influence of the
Chicago School).
51 Alan Devlin, On the Ramifications of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.:
Are Tie-Ins Next?, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 387, 388, 390 (2008) (characterizing “[t]he Supreme Court’s
2007 decision in Leegin. . . [as] a long overdue implementation of ubiquitously accepted principles
of price theory” and a “major step toward obeisance to the Chicago School’s focus on price theory”);
Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 67, 84
(2003) (“Relying heavily on this hard form of price theory, the Supreme Court struck down the per
se rule against territorial restrictions and maximum resale price maintenance . . . .”); see also Michael
S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 48 (1994) (“The revitalization of
the rule of reason owed much to the Chicago school and its use of price theory to expose the flawed
economic premises underlying many of the old per se rules.”). For a classic price theoretic Chicago
School argument against per se illegality for resale price maintenance, see Robert H. Bork, Resale
Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950 (1968).
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abolishing the presumption that patents create market power.52 With respect
to oligopoly more generally, Twombly’s, Brooke Group’s, and Matsushita’s
skepticism towards oligopoly coordination in the absence of specific
agreement53 also arguably reflects the Chicago School’s price-theoretically
influenced belief that absent collusion, oligopoly would pose a problem only at
high levels of concentration.54 Symposium participants generally acknowledge
that this development reflects the influence of the Chicago School.55
Regarding mergers, the 1984 revision to the Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines raised the relevant concentration thresholds above those contained
in the 1968 Guidelines,56 as favored by the Populist School.57 Commentators
have noted the close connection between the revisions to the Merger

52 Devlin, supra note 51, at 391, 391 n.28 (noting how “Chicago-driven principles of price
theory” led the Supreme Court to eliminate “the presumption that patents confer market power” in
Illinois Tool). For the classic Chicago School statement that “a patent is not usually a monopoly in
the sense of price theory”, see Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 13, 14 (1998).
53 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (holding that “stating [a Sherman
Act § 1] claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made” and “an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will
not suffice”); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)
(“As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost . . . represents
competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without
courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price cutting.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986) (“To survive a motion for summary judgment or
for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence ‘that
tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted independently.”) (quoting
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
54 Posner, supra note 21, at 933 (citing the work of George Stigler); accord Richard S. Markovits,
A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REV. 919, 920 n.8 (1976) (similarly recognizing Stigler’s
work as an application of price theory to oligopoly). But see Steven C. Salop, Understanding Richard
Posner on Exclusionary Conduct, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2018, at 1, 8 (“[W]hile [Posner]
characterizes Stigler’s famous oligopoly collusion model as price theory, that model really is game
theoretic.” (footnote omitted)).
55 See Baker & Farrell, supra note 3, at 2006, 2007 n.96 (stating that “[t]he Chicago perspective
. . . led the Supreme Court in Brooke Group to take the view that oligopoly coordination is hard to
achieve and unstable,” and that Matsushita and Twombly have “made it more difficult to use Section
1 of the Sherman Act to challenge coordinated oligopoly outcomes”); Gavil & Salop, supra note 3,
at 2123-24 (stating that the Chicago School criticisms of antitrust law have “been highly influential”
and citing to Matsushita, Twombly, and Brooke Group).
56 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.2221 (1984), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11249.pdf [http://perma.cc/D24Z-MZBH] (“The
Department is unlikely to challenge a merger on this ground unless . . . overall concentration of the
upstream market is above 1800 HHI . . . .”).
57 See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE
J. ON REG. 171, 187 (2002) (“[T]he Harvard School approach . . . became enshrined in the [1968]
Merger Guidelines . . . .”).
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Guidelines and price theory,58 and symposium participants explicitly
recognized that the revised Guidelines reflected the influence of Chicago
views59 and that the move away from “condemning very small horizontal
mergers . . . very likely increased consumer welfare and efficiency.”60
A close examination of antitrust scholarship and judicial decisions reveals
that the forces driving these doctrinal changes are more complex than often
recognized. On the one hand, the Harvard School exhibited greater openness
to price theory following Donald Turner’s “unacknowledged conversion
experience” that marks the dividing line between the Harvard School of the
1930s through the 1960s from the “new Harvard” position.61 In addition, new
Harvard School scholars joined in the attack on leverage theory,62 a point
often lost on Chicagoans.63 Similarly, Areeda and Turner’s endorsement of
cost as the test for predation in their landmark article on predatory pricing64
was, in Posner’s words, “pure textbook price theory unadorned by any of the
concepts of industrial organization,” such as strategic behavior.65 That said,
their advocacy of average variable cost over marginal cost as the more
administrable second-best test for predation represented a fusion of price
theory with classic Harvard School institutional concerns.66

58 Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications
for Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 464, 476 (1983) (noting and criticizing the fact that “[t]he
Guidelines are founded on neoclassical price theory”).
59 Baker & Farrell, supra note 3, at 2008 (“The 1982 Merger Guidelines were predicated on a
Chicagoan view of oligopolistic coordination.”).
60 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1848.
61 HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 37 (noting that “the Harvard School underwent a significant
transformation in the late 1970s” that “departed significantly from Harvard orthodoxy” developed
in the 1930s through the 1960s); Crane, supra note 4, at 45 (drawing a similar distinction between
“Paleo-Harvard” and “Neo-Harvard”); William E. Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation
of US Antitrust History, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 459, 467-68 (2020) (“The Harvard School . . .
encompasses two periods of thought—the intervention-friendly structure-conduct-performance
thinking from the 1930s into the 1960s, and a more cautious perspective, anchored in institutional
considerations popularized by Phillip Areeda, which emerged from the 1970s onward.”).
62 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1867.
63 See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 311, 365–66 (2009) (noting that the critique of the leverage theory “has been considered a core
principle of the Chicago School critique of the Harvard School,” but “the leveraging theory never
held a secure place in . . . the writings of Harvard School economists”).
64 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1869 (noting that the Supreme Court adopted
the Areeda-Turner test); Kovacic, supra note 6, at 46 (“[T]he article became the starting point for
judicial analysis of below-cost pricing claims.”).
65 Posner, supra note 2121, at 940; accord Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing
and Strategic Theory, 89 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2476 (2001) (noting that Areeda and Turner’s article injected
price theory into the analysis of predatory pricing); Nicola Giocoli, Games Judges Don’t Play:
Predatory Pricing and Strategic Reasoning in US Antitrust, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 271, 279-280 (2014)
(noting that Areeda & Turner’s predatory pricing test “came directly from price theory”).
66 Kovacic, supra note 6, at 42–50.
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Conversely, Chicago School scholarship incorporated forms of economic
analysis beyond price theory. For example, some Chicago School arguments
invoked transaction cost economics,67 which became the basis of the Supreme
Court’s landmark Sylvania decision.68 Chicagoans have similarly noted that
the Chicago School “leaned heavily on neoclassical price theory, but also
relied upon the economics of information, the economics of price
discrimination, the theory of the firm, the theory of public goods, the theory
of natural monopoly, and even game theory.”69 And Chicagoans and critics
both credit the Chicago School for pioneering modern theories of strategic
conduct, such as raising rivals’ costs.70
Moreover, as the Chicago School’s supporters themselves recognized, its
victory was far from complete in the Supreme Court.71 With respect to
vertical restraints, rather than follow the Chicago School’s call for per se
legality,72 the Supreme Court instead subjected them to the rule of reason,73
a decision more in line with new Harvard School thinking.74 Supreme Court

67 Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 143, 203 (1997) (“Despite references by Chicagoans to ‘price theory,’ Chicago’s approach to
vertical restraints has never rested upon . . . price theory. Instead, the Chicago approach to vertical
restraints is an application of [New Institutional Economics] . . . .”).
68 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977).
69 Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 152 (footnotes omitted).
70 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 251 (2d ed. 2001); Steven C. Salop, Economic
Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 141, 144 (“[I]t is important to recognize
that [raising rivals’ cost] has its roots in the economic analysis of Chicago School commentators.”);
Peter C. Carstensen, Director and Levi After 40 Years: The Anti-Antitrust Agenda Revisited, 17 MISS.
C. L. REV. 37, 40 (1996) (discussing how Director and Levi advanced a “precursor of . . . the raising
rivals’ costs hypothesis”); Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 161-62 (concluding that Chicago’s
recognition of a raising rivals’ costs theory “clearly exposes the fallacy of those who argue that
Chicago conveniently ignored relevant theories on ideological grounds”). For the seminal Chicago
School articulation of raising rivals’ costs, see Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the
Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290, 293 (1956).
71 See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Aaron Director’s Influence on Antitrust Policy, 48 J.L. & ECON. 313, 32528 (2005) (finding that the Chicago School had effected a major change in predatory pricing, earned a
“partial victory” on vertical restraints, and had minimal impact on the leverage theory of tying).
72 See BORK, supra note 18, at 288 (“Analysis shows that every vertical restraint should be
completely lawful.”); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 22–25 (1981) (advocating for “the rule of per se
legality” in certain circumstances, including “price as well as nonprice cases”).
73 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882, 887–907
(2007) (rejecting the rule of per se invalidity and adopting the rule of reason instead); State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 22 (1997) (same); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
47–59 (1977) (using the rule of reason standard as opposed to any per se prohibition).
74 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1871 (“While the Supreme Court wisely
overruled the per se rules against nonprice restraints and [resale price maintenance], it adopted the
rule of reason advocated by the Harvard School, rather than the Chicago preference for rules of per
se legality.”); see also Elhauge, supra note 5, at 59 (“[O]n every issue the Court has addressed where
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decisions also reflect an embrace of decision theory75 that places greater
emphasis on the potential adverse impact of false positives than on false
negatives.76 Although the adoption of an error-cost framework is often
regarded as distinctively Chicagoan,77 key decisions such as Trinko
supplemented decision theory with Harvard School concerns about
institutional competence.78 Subsequent revisions to the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines in 1992 and 2010 recognized the importance of potential strategic
conduct, both in terms of assessing the competitive impact of a merger (such
as asking whether one of the merger partners is a maverick) and in asking
whether the merger would facilitate post-merger unilateral anticompetitive
conduct,79 developments that symposium participants recognize is distinctly
anti-Chicagoan.80 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s conception of entry
barriers remains distinctively Harvardian, not Chicagoan.81
What explains these mixed results? As some participants have noted, the
Chicago School overreached in some respects, often offering no more than
[the Harvard School and the Chicago School] are in conflict, the Supreme Court has sided with the
Harvard school.”).
75 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (“[J]udicial
errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.”).
76 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)
(“The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.”); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (finding that “mistaken inferences in
cases such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect” and balancing this concern against punishing “illegal conspiracies” is “unusually
one-sided in cases such as this one”).
77 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1869 (“One important element of the Chicago
School’s ideology was its analysis of error costs that put large weight on type one errors . . . .”).
78 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414-15 (reasoning that “[e]ven if the problem of false positives did not
exist,” courts’ inability to “‘explain or adequately and reasonably supervise’” duties to deal counsels
against recognizing liability under the essential facility doctrine (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential
Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989)).
79 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.12 (1992),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XYF6Y69] [hereinafter 1992 MG] (“[An] acquisition of a maverick firm is one way in which a merger
may make coordinated interaction more likely, more successful, or more complete.”); U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 2.1.5, 6 (2010),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [
https://perma.cc/4V2K-D3CN] [hereinafter 2010 HMG] (discussing both whether a firm is a
maverick firm and describing certain unilateral effects post-merger that would lessen competition).
80 Baker & Farrell, supra note 3, at 2008-09 (contrasting the 1982 “Chicagoan” Merger
Guidelines with later Merger Guidelines “rooted in the modern economics of coordination through
purposive conduct”).
81 Jonathan B. Baker, Responding to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the Merger
Guidelines, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 189, 193 (2003) (discussing how the FTC’s 1985 Echlin decision was
framed as a conflict between Bainian and Stiglerian conceptions of entry barriers and noting that “if
Stigler won the definitional battle in Echlin, Bain won the war”); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever
Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 614–15 (2018) (“Today it is clear
that the Harvard school has won this battle in both the caselaw and enforcement policy.”).
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possibility theorems rather than general proofs.82 The explanation for that
overreach lies in part in the pro-enforcement context in which the Chicago
School arose.83 When confronted with a conventional wisdom, particularly in
the form of a per se prohibition, possibility theorems can serve as a useful
disproof by counterexample.84 However, mere possibility theorems are
insufficient to justify a per se rule running in the other direction.85 To this
extent, the Chicago School’s inconsistent track record may reflect the typical
situation in which the pendulum begins moving in one direction to return
closer to equilibrium, only to swing too far.
In addition, Chicago School scholars were far more unified in their
opposition to the existing antitrust jurisprudence of the 1950s and 1960s than
they were regarding what should replace it.86 As a movement, the Chicago
School remains more diverse than is often recognized.87
That said, another more fundamental factor underlay the incomplete
reception of Chicago School thought, specifically, price theory’s goal of
creating a simple, static model of competition that cut across market
structures and ignored details of different industries and individual firm
behavior.88 This blind spot paved the way for the post-Chicago School based
on the game theory revolution that would soon sweep microeconomics and
industrial organization.
These limitations make blanket claims of the prevalence of price theory
feel somewhat overblown.89 At the same time, criticisms that the Chicago
School has not been influential seem equally overstated, as participants in this

82 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1870 (“The Chicago School’s influence on
antitrust decision making in the federal courts has been more ideological than technical.”).
83 Id. at 1863 (noting that in the 1980s, enforcement policy began to consider additional factors
beyond “pure structure”).
84 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 179, 183-85 (2008).
85 See id. (describing the use of exemplifying theory by Chicago School theorists to justify a
categorical rule in which vertical restraints would be per se legal).
86 Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 171 (“Chicago had not focused on the many details for
antitrust policy that would be necessary once the old order was overthrown. There was simply no
shared, agreed-upon view regarding the myriad aspects of appropriate doctrine.”).
87 See F.M. Scherer, Conservative Economics and Antitrust: A Variety of Influences, in HOW THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 30, 32-36 (giving examples to illustrate how
the Chicago School was “far from monolithic in advocating a retrenchment of antitrust enforcement
programs”); Wright, supra note 19, at 244-45 (stating that the Chicago School does not “represent a
monolithic entity”); see also Kovacic, supra note 34, at 468 (noting how the Chicago school is not “singleminded”); Daniel A. Crane, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 44
(2012) (“It is difficult enough to draw the lines around the Chicago School . . . .”).
88 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1854.
89 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 21, at 932 (claiming that price theory “has largely prevailed”).
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symposium readily acknowledged.90 Indeed, the fact that the Chicago School
remains a magnet for so much criticism attests to its enduring importance.91
II. THE POST-CHICAGO REVOLUTION
The Chicago School spawned a new school whose name, post-Chicago,
was inspired by Herbert Hovenkamp.92 One surprise is that none of the
articles included in a symposium on “The Post Chicago Antitrust Revolution”
uses the term, let alone identifies the defining characteristics of the School.
Fortunately, other scholarship defines the outlines of the movement
clearly enough. As an initial matter, the post-Chicago School joins the
Chicago School in rejecting populist considerations and in accepting the
maximization of economic welfare as the sole focus of antitrust.93 In the
words of Carl Shapiro, “[I]f ‘Post-Chicago Economics’ stands for the notion
that . . . antitrust should move away from promoting efficiency and consumer
welfare, count me out.”94
What separates the two schools is not their goals, but their vision of the
relevant mechanisms through which economics acts. While the Chicago
School placed little emphasis on the game theory revolution that swept

90 See, e.g., Baker & Farrell, supra note 3, at 2005-06 (describing the influence of the Chicago
School view of oligopolies on antitrust enforcement); Gavil & Salop, supra note 3, at 2123-24;
Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1870.
91 See, e.g., Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 169-70 (arguing that the recent book How the
Chicago School Overshot the Mark “use[s] . . . the term Chicago as a political football” by ignoring
Chicago’s commitment to “a bottom-up approach based primarily on fact-intensive, case-by-case
analysis” and instead oversimplifying it as “a universal conservative ideology of antitrust minimalism
with a preference for ‘economic models over facts’” (citing Robert Pitofsky, Introduction: Setting the
Stage, in HOW CHICAGO OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1)); Kovacic, supra note 34, at 484-86
(examining “the breadth and power of the Chicago Obsession”); Wright, supra note 19, at 318-19
(describing antitrust analyses framed as critiques of the Chicago School and noting that “misuses of
the term ‘Chicago School’ . . . come at the expense of serious scientific analysis”).
92 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 225 (1985)
(“[A]ntitrust policy is coming increasingly under the influence of a ‘post-Chicago’ economics . . . .”).
93 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 35, at 646 (differentiating Post-Chicago from the Populist School
and noting that the latter’s “challenges to Chicago arise from within the efficiency paradigm”);
Jacobs, supra note 7, at 242 (noting that post-Chicago and Chicago scholars “share a common metric”
in that “[t]hey eschew the multivalent inquiries informing the Modern Populists’ approach in favor
of the single-minded pursuit of allocative efficiency” and “agree that wealth maximization should be
the exclusive goal of antitrust policy”).
94 Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J.
483, 484 (1995) (footnote omitted).
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through industrial organization and microeconomics during the beginning in
the 1970s,95 the post-Chicago School embraced it.96
Although the post-Chicago School is often characterized as the inheritor
of the legacy of the Harvard School, an examination of its premises reveals
some stark differences. Unlike the Harvard School, which focused almost
entirely on market structure without paying any attention to conduct, the
game theory embraced by the post-Chicago School places strategic behavior
at the center of the analysis.97 In addition, although post-Chicago analyses
are able to take into account more complex dynamics than those permitted by
the price-theoretic approach of the Chicago School, the game-theoretic
approach by post-Chicago studies lacks the industry specificity inherent in
the case study-based approach of the Harvard School. Instead, post-Chicago
models tend to be quite abstract.
Consider two prominent examples of post-Chicago scholarship. Michael
Whinston’s famous article showing how tying can lead to exclusion is based
on the relative sizes of the outside demand for a complementary good and
the minimum efficient scale needed to produce it efficiently.98 Whinston’s
result turns on the relationship between these two numbers without taking
into account any unique aspects of any particular industry. Thomas
Krattenmaker and Steven Salop’s now classic article on raising rivals’ costs
similarly frames the issues in non-industry-specific terms by exploring how a
firm can use exclusionary rights contracts to restrict the competitors’ ability
to obtain access to a key input.99 The results turn on a general principle: the
presence of an upstream-downstream relationship. The details of the specific
industry in question play little to no role.

95 See Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1849-50, 1855 (noting that Robert Bork’s
influential Chicago School treatise did not use game theory and that the Chicago School “fir[mly]
reject[ed]” game theory). But see Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 152, 159 (claiming that some
Chicago School analyses relied on game theory) (citing George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J.
POL. ECON. 44 (1964)).
96 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 2, at 1856 (noting that the game theory revolution
of the 1970s and 1980s was an “important advance in oligopoly theory”); accord HOVENKAMP, supra
note 29, at 38 (“[P]ost-Chicago theory typically models strategic behavior by use of game
theory . . . .”); Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1315 (1990) (“[T]he
new game theory is the core methodology of the new ‘new learning’ in industrial organization . . . .”);
Jacobs, supra note 7, at 240-45 (tracing the role of game theory in post-Chicago analysis).
97 HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 37-38 (identifying the pre-1970 Harvard School idea of
empowering the government to “break up durable monopolists even if they had not engaged in any
unlawful conduct” and contrasting it with the post-Chicago School, which “typically models
strategic behavior by use of game theory”).
98 Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990).
99 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs
to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 224-27 (1986).
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The result is a mathematically driven approach that is quite different from
the bottom-up empiricism that characterized the Harvard School. Rather
than being the inheritor of the Harvard School tradition, the post-Chicago
School represents something quite different that reflects the times during
which it arose.
While the game-theoretic framework that characterizes post-Chicago
scholarship yields substantial insights, it carries with it a number of
limitations, both theoretically and empirically.100 In addition, many
commentators have questioned how much impact post-Chicago economics
has had on Supreme Court doctrine.101
A. The Conceptual Limits of Game Theory
By their nature, the results of post-Chicago models typically derive from
the assumption that particular decisions must be made in a particular order.102
This results in models that are quite stylized. Moreover, scholars have long
recognized that the Nash equilibrium-inspired solution concepts that form
the basis of game theory often yield no equilibria or multiple equilibria unless
the model makes highly restrictive assumptions.103 When this is the case, the
details of those assumptions drive the results.
The dependence of these models on these restrictive assumptions often makes
them susceptible to large, discontinuous changes in response to small changes to
the underlying parameters.104 The violation of the Einsteinian admonition that

100 For an earlier discussion of these limitations in the context of vertical integration, see
Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy 19 YALE J. ON REG.
171, 295 (2002).
101 See, e.g., Christopher J. Sprigman, Monopolization Remedies and Antitrust After the Fall, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 9 (2009) (“[P]ost-Chicago insights have had little apparent impact in litigation . . . .”).
102 See Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert?,
34 AKRON L. REV. 795, 797 (2001) (“[T]he outcome of a [post-Chicago economics] model often
depends on whether customers or competitors can undertake strategies to counter the alleged
anticompetitive behavior. In other cases, the order in which the parties execute strategies is
important.” (footnote omitted)).
103 See Ayres, supra note 96, at 1310-11 (noting the role that restrictive assumptions play in
preventing game-theoretic models from yielding no equilibria or multiple equilibria); Interview with
Dennis A. Yao, Former FTC Commissioner, ANTITRUST, Fall 1994, at 12, 16 ( “Game-theoretic models
generally become unwieldy unless they adopt restrictive assumptions”); Michael A. Salinger, Dir.,
Bureau of Econ., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Is It Live or Is It Memorex? Models of Vertical Mergers and
Antitrust Enforcement, Speech at Association of Competition Economics Seminar on Non-Horizontal
Mergers 3-4 (Sept. 7–8, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/itlive-or-it-memorex-models-vertical-mergers-and-antitrust-enforcement/050927isitlive.pdf [http://perma
.cc/TP68-4AKQ] (noting that Post-Chicago theories rely on highly stylized assumptions to make the
models tractable).
104 See Ayres, supra note 96, at 1313-14 (“Calculating the comparative statics in game theory
models, however, is often much more difficult than simply taking derivatives. Moreover, many games
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“nature does not jump” raises questions about the accuracy with which these
models describe actual competitive processes as well as their robustness.105
Furthermore, post-Chicago models typically do not attempt to formalize
the impact of the practices in question on welfare.106 A good example is, again,
Michael Whinston’s seminal article on tying, which explicitly acknowledges
that the model does not consider potential beneficial motivations for the
practice and thus that its welfare implications are ambiguous.107 This is
particularly important because post-Chicago models typically rely on the
type of concentrated market structures in which vertical coordination is most
likely to yield efficiencies.108
B. The Need for More Empirical Validation
Skeptics have consistently criticized the post-Chicago School for its lack
of empiricism.109 Although some post-Chicago scholars have asserted that
exhibit discontinuous changes when the underlying structure is changed slightly.”); see also Coate &
Fischer, supra note 102, at 823 (“[Post-Chicago] theories are highly sensitive to the assumptions used.”).
105 See Ayres, supra note 96, at 1314.
106 An exception is Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON.
345, 346 (1988).
107 See Whinston, supra note 98, at 855-56 (“Even in the simple models . . . which ignore a number of
other possible motivations for the practice, the impact of this exclusion on welfare is uncertain.”).
108 Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 471 (2001) (“[T]he most plausible post-Chicago theory of anticompetitive
tying is based on the assumption that the tying and tied goods are complementary and that they are
both susceptible to market power and, indeed, monopoly. It is a long-established principle of
economics, however, that integrated complementary monopoly results in lower prices than distinct
complementary monopolies. A public policy that imparts a bias toward interdependent
complementary monopolies instead of integrated complementary monopolies has the predictable
consequence of raising prices and reducing consumer welfare.”); Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E.
Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 589-91 (1991)
(tracing the potential efficiency benefits and noting that “meeting the necessary conditions for
anticompetitive exclusion is likely to ensure that some efficiency benefits are realized from the
business practices in question”).
109 See Crane, supra note 4, at 1924-27 (criticizing post-Chicago (as well as Chicago) for its lack
of empiricism); David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Competition Thinking at the European Commission:
Lessons from the Aborted GE/Honeywell Merger, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 489, 515 (2002) (“[E]mpirical
analysis is precisely the big step that has been missing in translating post-Chicago analysis into a
practical policy tool.”); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 80, 98 (2005) (criticizing PostChicago for its lack of reliance on data and expressing a need for empirical study of the cost of errors
in enforcement); Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 4, at 148 (“[T]he lack of empirical verification . . .
likely has limited the impact of Post-Chicago School economics on U.S. antitrust law”); id. at 159
(arguing that the emphasis on game theory has led “the Post-Chicago School [to] largely eschew[]
generation of specific testable hypotheses and empirical testing of these models”); Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Game Theory and Antitrust: A Post Mortem, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 411, 412 (1997)
(“[G]ame theoretic models of IO have not been empirically verified in a meaningful sense.”); Joshua
D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School’s Influence on Antitrust,
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empiricism represents a key aspect of their methodology,110 others have
acknowledged that “[p]ost-Chicago scholars readily admit” that “[m]ore
theoretical and empirical economic work . . . needs to be done.”111
Why has so little empirical validation of post-Chicago models been done?
Sometimes post-Chicago models are based on the presumed order of
decisions or other inherently unobservable characteristics that cannot easily
be verified.112 Even when the facts can be verified, the stylized nature of postChicago models further means that even when they are valid, they will apply
only when the full set of restrictive criteria are met.113
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2009, at 189, 189-90 (reviewing HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1) (criticizing the book for its lack of empiricism); Paul Yde, NonHorizontal Merger Guidelines: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 74, 76
(“[Post-Chicago] theories of anticompetitive effects from vertical integration are not supported by
any systematic empirical analysis.”).
110 See Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 512
n.109 (2006) (“Post-Chicago criticisms . . . call for modifications to existing rules based upon the
application of game theoretic tools and new empirical economic methods.”); Timothy F. Bresnahan
& Richard Schmalensee, The Empirical Renaissance in Industrial Economics: An Overview, 35 J. INDUS.
ECON. 371, 374 (1987) (calling empirical work motivated by structural models of imperfect competition
“a growth area”); Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994)
(“Post-Chicago theory . . . contemplates rigorous empirical analysis . . . .”); Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Post-Chicago Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate
Theoretical World, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 670 (1995) (“Post-Chicago antitrust . . . digs into empirical
material in an effort to fathom the significance of observed distinctions between classic models and the
configuration of the particular market under examination.”).
111 Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 811 n.306 (2004); accord Marina
Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 179 (2004)
(“[P]ost-Chicago economic analysis is far from determinate, and empirical work is insufficiently
developed to answer critical questions bearing on antitrust liability.”). Many post-Chicago scholars
have written specific statements to this effect. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Wrong Turns in Exclusive
Dealing Law, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, 156, 167
(“There is a lot of speculating about the effects of exclusive dealing but not nearly enough empirical
research.”); Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 330, 409 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (using game theory
to identify “quite a large number of strategic considerations that come into play” and determining
that “[w]hat we are most in need of now are further tests of the empirical validity of these various
theories of strategic behavior”); David T. Scheffman & Richard S. Higgins, Twenty Years of Raising
Rivals’ Costs: History, Assessment, and Future, 12 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 371, 380 (2003) (assessing the
empirical support for raising rivals’ costs and concluding that “a fair assessment of the debate has
been that . . . most of the cases [Krattenmaker and Salop] discuss . . . are not proved”).
112 See Coate & Fischer, supra note 102, at 832 (noting that post-Chicago models are often
“based on virtual facts that cannot be revealed in a court hearing . . . because the facts in question
exist primarily as theoretical constructs to aid the modeling process”); accord id. at 797, 816
(hypothesizing that post-Chicago theories cannot find empirical support); Jacobs, supra note 7, at
254 (“[S]ome post-Chicago models depend on speculation about the reputational effects of
apparently irrational strategic behavior . . . making empirical validation impossible.”).
113 See Ayres, supra note 96, at 1317 (“[P]articularized games are not neatly applicable to a broad
spectrum of markets . . . . [A] number of ‘possibility’ theorems . . . force both sides toward empirical
analysis.”); Coate & Fischer, supra note 102, at 832 (“[Post-Chicago models] offer[] little if any
empirical fruitfulness because the mathematical result of the model applies only when the
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Absent empirical validation, post-Chicago models represent possibility
theorems that tell us what can happen rather than “what must happen.”114 As
was the case with respect to the Chicago School, these theorems are more
useful for rebutting a conventional wisdom or for countering calls for
categorical rules than they are in providing insight into how to strike the
proper balance. It is noteworthy that Robert Pitofsky criticized the Chicago
School for relying more on theory than on facts.115 Absent empirical
validation, the same can be said of post-Chicago.116
C. Post-Chicago’s Impact on the Law
The other key question is how influential the post-Chicago School has
been on the law. Critics often claim that Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc.117 represents the only post-Chicago decision rendered by the
Supreme Court.118 Moreover, Kodak has not proven to be generative. The
plaintiff abandoned its post-Chicago theory on remand,119 and “lower courts
have bent over backwards to construe Kodak as narrowly as possible,”120 as
even supporters have been forced to concede.121
assumptions are met . . . . Thus [they] simply will not apply to many, if any, factual situations.”);
Hylton & Salinger, supra note 108, at 470 (“[T]he game theory underpinning the literature rests on
highly stylized assumptions that are difficult to apply to the factual settings courts confront.”);
Jacobs, supra note 7, at 254 (“[M]any post-Chicago theories are constructed so restrictively . . . that
testing them is unproductive.”).
114 Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. ECON. 113,
118 (1989).
115 See Robert Pitofsky, Introduction: Setting the Stage, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 1, at 5 (critiquing the “current preferences for economic models
over facts”).
116 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 29, at 39 (“Just as Chicago School antitrust policy became
oversold, post-Chicago antitrust has been oversold as well.”).
117 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
118 See Crane, supra note 4, at 1922 (“[I]t is conventional wisdom that there has been one—and
only one—‘post-Chicago’ antitrust decision in the Supreme Court.”); Hylton & Salinger, supra note
108, at 481 (“Of the Supreme Court’s cases, only one, Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services,
Inc., arguably falls into . . . the post-Chicago category.” (footnote omitted)); Fred S. McChesney,
Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1401, 1414 (2003) (“‘[P]ost-Chicago’ economic approaches to antitrust have had no important
impact in the courts.”); Wright, supra note 19, at 249-50 (“While the Post-Chicago School has
enjoyed meteoric success via several meaningful scholarly benchmarks, . . . it has had only modest
impact in American courts, especially the Supreme Court.”).
119 See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Abbott
B. Lipsky, Jr., Antitrust Economics—Making Progress, Avoiding Regression, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 163, 16869 (2003) (“[T]he ‘post-Chicago’ theory found in Image Technical was abandoned on remand . . . .”).
120 Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 257, 286.
121 Warren S. Grimes, The Future of Distribution Restraints Law: Will the New Learning Take Hold?,
2006 UTAH L. REV. 885, 910 (2006) (“[Kodak], a powerfully written post-Chicago opinion, has so far
found only isolated support in the lower courts and federal agencies . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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But signs of broader acceptance of post-Chicago thinking become more
apparent once one looks beyond the Supreme Court. Herbert Hovenkamp has
noted that notwithstanding Kodak’s limited influence, post-Chicago’s
contributions to raising rivals’ costs and the unilateral effects of horizontal
mergers “are likely to endure,” although “they . . . pose a significant risk of being
overused if their limitations are not kept in mind.”122 For example, the post-1984
Merger Guidelines exhibit a greater willingness to recognize that unilateral
strategic behavior can have anticompetitive effects.123 In addition, lower court
decisions have shown greater willingness to adopt post-Chicago precepts.124
III. BEYOND POST-CHICAGO?
This milestone conference provides the opportunity not just to recognize
the place that the Chicago and the post-Chicago Schools have carved for
themselves in the history of antitrust. It also provides the occasion to
speculate on the prospects of nascent movements that may influence the
directions that competition law will take in the future.
A. The Emerging Debate Over Neo-Brandeisian/Hipster Antitrust
A surprising aspect of the symposium was the lack of any extensive
discussion of the growing call for a return to populist principles that is
emerging in antitrust circles.125 Called neo-Brandeisian antitrust by its
supporters126 and hipster antitrust by skeptics,127 and popularized by Lina

Hovenkamp, supra note 120, at 337.
See generally 1992 MG, supra note 79, § 2.2; 2010 HMG, supra note 79, § 6; U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4, https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-guid
elines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y6B-26V7].
124 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003); LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324
F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002); C.R. Bard,
Inc v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Crane, supra note 4, at 1930 n.73 (citing United States
v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005) as an example).
125 For my initial reaction, see Christopher S. Yoo, Hipster Antitrust: New Bottles, Same Old
W(h)ine?, ANTITRUST CHRON., Spring 2018, at 52.
126 David Dayen, This Budding Movement Wants to Smash Monopolies, THE NATION (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/this-budding-movement-wants-to-smash-monopolies
[http://perma.cc/NL98-WJ5L] (“A new group of scholars and activists has rebelled against Chicagoschool dictates. You can call them the ‘New Brandeis movement.’”).
127 The term was coined by Kostya Medvedovsky. @kmedved, TWITTER (June 19, 2017, 2:28 PM),
https://twitter.com/kmedved/status/876869328934711296 [https://perma.cc/4G3X-HX6L]. The term was
popularized by Joshua Wright. Robert Levine, Antitrust Law Never Envisioned Massive Tech Companies Like
Google, BOS. GLOBE (June 13, 2018), https://www3.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2018/06/13/google-hugelypowerful-antitrust-law-job/E1eqrlQ01g11DRM8I9FxwO/story.html [https://perma.cc/X3QS-KZP2].
122
123
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Khan128 and Barry Lynn,129 these advocates are calling for a return to a more
structure-oriented conception of competition policy that also accounts for the
interests of other economic stakeholders as well as political considerations.
This movement has garnered support from both ends of the political spectrum,
being endorsed by multiple Democratic presidential candidates during the
2020 campaign130 as well as conservative pundits such as Steve Bannon.131
To date, the revival of populism has not gained much traction in
mainstream antitrust circles. Noninterventionist antitrust scholars were
predictably dubious.132 Enforcement-oriented scholars and advocates were
similarly skeptical.133 Scholars attempting to position themselves between
these two approaches also sounded notes of caution.134
Any major shifts in antitrust law that may occur will not happen quickly.
The hierarchical nature of the courts and the manner in which federal judges
are appointed make antitrust doctrine slow to change. Major reform
128 See generally Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2017)
(recommending “restoring traditional antitrust and competition policy principles” to address the
power of certain twenty-first century commercial giants like Amazon).
129 The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of Doubt?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, and Consumer Rights & S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 7, 9, 15 (2017) (testimony of Barry C. Lynn, Executive Director, Open Markets
Institute),https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-13-17%20Lynn%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QXH3-2JJB].
130 Kirin Stacey & Kadhim Shubber, Democratic Calls to Break Up Big Tech Raise Fears in Silicon
Valley, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/acfceb66-4695-11ea-aee29ddbdc86190d [https://perma.cc/6YT4-29J2].
131 Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants to Do to Google, ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/08/steve-bannon-google-facebook/535473
[http://perma.cc/VC6T-UM97] (“Steve Bannon, the chief strategist to President Donald Trump,
believes Facebook and Google should be regulated as public utilities.”).
132 See Daniel A. Crane, Four Questions for the Neo-Brandeisians, ANTITRUST CHRON., Spring
2018, at 63, 64 (posing four questions regarding the Neo-Brandeisians attack on the consumer
welfare standard and appearing to poke some holes in the new “consensus”). See generally Joshua D.
Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick & Jan M. Rybnicek, Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise
and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293 (2019).
133 The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of Doubt?: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Antitrust of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5–6, 8, 9 (2017) (statement
of Diana Moss, President, American Antitrust Institute), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
download/12-13-17-moss-testimony [http://perma.cc/YB4T-NWQM] (“[T]he issue of consumer
welfare has been the subject of much confusion . . . .”); id. at 3-4 (statement of Carl Shapiro,
Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy, Walter A. Haas School of Business, University of
California at Berkeley), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/12-13-17-shapiro-testimony
[http://perma.cc/3CRZ-N4AR] (“I have seen no evidence whatsoever that the ‘consumer welfare’
standard is somehow outdated . . . .”); Marina Lao, Strengthening Antitrust Enforcement Within the
Consumer Welfare Rubric, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2019, at 1, 3 (discussing “New Brandeisians”);
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 745-46 (2018) (discussing
“[e]conomic populism as an opportunity and a threat”).
134 Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, 45 J. CORP. L. 101,
117-28 (2019).
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legislation also takes time and is likely to be hard to enact in the current
political environment. Only time will tell what the ultimate impact of this
movement will be.
B. The Growing Emphasis on Empiricism
The development that seems almost certain to have a major impact on
antitrust law is the growing emphasis on empirical analysis. The change is
perhaps most evident in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which
subordinated structural issues, such as market definition and market
shares/concentration, that used to be the first considerations mentioned in
previous versions of the Guidelines and instead emphasized evidence of
adverse competitive effects.135 Indeed, the Guidelines explicitly state that
“[t]he Agencies’ analysis need not start with market definition” when they
can assess potential competitive harms using analytical tools that do not rely
on market definition.136 The growing emphasis was also apparent in the
decision rejecting the U.S. government’s attempt to block AT&T from
acquiring Time Warner, which discounted a parameterized post-Chicago
style bargaining model and instead credited an econometric regression
analysis of prior instances of vertical integration in the market for
multichannel television.137
The move towards empiricism may be regarded as the logical next step in
antitrust analysis. As the history of the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm reveals, antitrust’s concern has always been on market performance
and turned to structural inferences because direct data on market performance
was generally unavailable. When direct evidence of performance became
available, relying on it became preferable, particularly when there were
multiple forces pushing in different directions and the net effect depends on
which effects dominate. Indeed, this empiricism may be the more appropriate
inheritor of the Harvard School tradition than the post-Chicago School.
CONCLUSION
In some ways, framing antitrust debates as a fundamental conflict between
Chicago and New Harvard or post-Chicago seems somewhat overdrawn. All
of these Schools concur in rejecting the pluralist approach advocated by the
Populist School and embrace economic welfare as the exclusive focus of
antitrust law. The key differences lie in the types of economic analysis favored
135 See 2010 HMG, supra note 79 (listing the section discussing adverse competitive effects
(section 2) well before the section on market concentration (section 5)).
136 Id. § 4.
137 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1036-42, 1045-47 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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by each School: price theory for Chicago, institutional considerations for New
Harvard, and game theory for post-Chicago. To some extent, these variations
reflect shifts in the current state of the art in economic scholarship. From a
broader perspective, casting them as mutually exclusive options seems unduly
restrictive, since all three approaches would seem to have important roles to
play in analyzing competition and markets.
Strikingly, both Chicago and post-Chicago admonish the other side for
relying on abstract economic models that are largely conceptual and
insufficiently empirical. In this regard, both critiques appear to have merit.
Absent empirical validation, both sides are effectively reduced to offering
possibility theorems that are well suited to debunking sweeping economic
claims but offer less in terms of specific guidance on how to strike particular
balances in real-world markets.
Questions about the goals of antitrust and the role of empiricism are
emerging as important forces in the current debate over the future of antitrust
law. To date, neo-Brandeisian attempts to revive the Populist School’s
embrace of a pluralist vision of antitrust that takes more than just economic
considerations into account has gained little traction. Only time will tell if
that remains true in the future. At the same time, empiricism has become
increasingly influential in antitrust analysis. It is possible that the emerging
importance of empirical analysis may permanently shift focus away from
structure, and even conduct, and towards more direct measures of market
performance. Although neither trend was given much consideration during
this symposium, I have little doubt that both will be given a thorough
exploration at an event organized by this Law Review sometime in the future.
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